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Introduction 
The Water Quality Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-
4) created a National Estuarine Program with a 
fourfold purpose: 
1. identification of nationally significant estuar-
ies that are threatened by pollution, develop-
ment, or overuse; 
2. promotion of comprehensive planning for, and 
conservation and management of, nationally 
significant estuaries; 
3. preparation of management plans; and 
4. coordination of estuarine research (101 Stat 
61). 
The law gave "priority consideration" to Albem-
arle Sound, North Carolina. A joint project of the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and the State of North Carolina, the 
Albemarle-Pamlico Estuarine Study (A/P Study) 
was the first program designated under the 1987 
amendments to the Clean Water Act. Developing 
a comprehensive resource management plan for 
the Albemarle-Pamlico drainage basin emerged 
as a major goal of the A/P Study. 
This paper will summarize the results of a 
project designed to gather and analyze back-
ground information necessary for development 
of a comprehensive management plan for the 
Currituck Sound drainage basin, a small portion 
of the greater Albemarle-Pamlico watershed. In 
addition to the waters of Currituck Sound, the 
study area included 26,000 acres of open water 
in Back Bay, Virginia and the land draining into 
Currituck Sound, Back Bay, Northwest River, 
North Landing River, and other tributaries to 
Currituck Sound (Figure 1). Based on North 
Carolina Center for Geographic Information and 
Analysis calculations, the Currituck Sound 
watershed covers approximately 733 square 
miles. 
Land in the Currituck Sound watershed is 
devoted to many different uses including agricul-
tural production, urban development, and pres-
ervation. A sprawling city, farms, hamlets, 
forests, marshes, and sand dunes jointly occupy 
the study area. The City of Virginia Beach, 
located in the northernmost portion of the 
drainage basin, threatens to expand urban 
development southward. Rapid population 
growth and development are challenging the 
Currituck Sound drainage basin's current rural 
character. Thus, the study area is in a period of 
change. The natural system is being surrounded 
by people and manmade environments. 
Future management of this rapidly changing 
watershed and its many resources depends on the 
answers to two questions: 
1. What are the the perceived issues surrounding 
management of the Currituck Sound drainage 
basin? 
2. What types of responsive management alter-
natives are available? 
Methods 
Government officials, natural resource manag-
ers, and researchers performing investigations in 
the study area were consulted for their views 
concerning management issues in the Currituck 
Sound drainage basin. Fifteen formal interviews 
and numerous informal interviews were con-
ducted over an 8 month period from December 
1989 through July 1990. Interview questions 
were tailored for the respective represented 
agencies or research programs. 
In addition, a short survey was used to deter-
mine general issue perception of the Currituck 
Sound Watershed Advisory Committee, the 15-
member advisory panel for the project. Members 
of the advisory committee included representa-
273 
tives of three federal resource management 
agencies, state officials from North Carolina and 
Virginia, a regional representative from sou-
theastern Virginia, and a member of the Albem-
arle Citizens' Advisory Committee. 
Perceived Management Issues 
During the course of the project, natural resource 
managers and scientists were asked to define 
management issues for Currituck Sound. There 
are no correct or incorrect opinions. Each 
interviewee had an individual perception of the 
issues in the watershed based on personal 
experiences, observations, and scientific evi-
dence. Perceptions differed widely between 
interviewees. 
Although no clear consensus exists on the 
nature and extent of problems in the Currituck 
Sound watershed, the interviews/surveys yielded 
two broad issue categories: 
1. Currituck Sound is perceived to be a declining 
resource with respect to water quality, the 
fishery, and waterfowl wintering grounds. 
2. Responsibility for management of this ecosys-
tem is split among multiple federal, state, and 
local jurisdictions. 
Interviewees also discerned the potential for 
future problems stemming from the continued 
growth and development predicted for the 
region, especially in regards to the limited water 
supply. Controversy surrounding the City of 
Virginia Beach's plans to pipe drinking water 
from Lake Gaston to the city has already eroded 
the relationship between the State of North 
Carolina and Commonwealth of Virginia. 
Resource managers recognized the need for 
immediate unified action in order to halt the 
decline of this shared estuarine system and 
address the water supply issue. 
Issue I: Declining Resource Values 
Water Quality 
At the present time, no one has examined 
Currituck Sound and its tributaries in terms of 
defining the highest uses for the Sound and 
conditions necessary to optimize those uses. In 
the absence of such standards, it is difficult to 
assess the status of water quality in the study 
area. Moreover, there is currently little water 
quality data for the Sound system, especially the 
portion located in North Carolina. Several 
interviewees and members of the Currituck 
Sound Watershed Advisory Committee pointed 
to the lack of scientific evidence to document 
declining water quality in Currituck Sound. 
Regardless, almost everyone agreed that water 
quality problems exist in the Sound and its 
tributaries. Eight of nine respondents to the 
issues survey ranked water quality problems as 
the "issue of greatest concern in terms of 
detrimental effects on the Currituck Sound 
drainage basin". What evidence is there to 
support this perception? 
In a 1986-87 study conducted in Back Bay, 
Virginia, suspended solids and total Kjeldahl 
nitrogen (TKN) surpassed or violated Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) reference levels 
(Southwick and Norman, 1987). A later study 
found very poor water clarity and high turbidity 
values in Back Bay. The turbidity appears to be 
"correlated with the continuing decline in aquatic 
vegetation" (Southwick, 1989). Between 1972-
78, submerged aquatic vegetation (SAV) suffered 
severe, rapid population declines in Back Bay. 
In the North Carolina portion of the drainage 
basin, the North Carolina Division of Environ-
mental Management operates one water quality 
monitoring station. Located at Point Harbor, the 
station monitors monthly for chlorophyll a, 
dissolved oxygen, coliform bacteria, pH, turbid-
ity, and certain metal concentrations. In 1989, 
chlorophyll a concentrations violated the North 
Carolina standard on one occasion. Although it 
was not a gross violation of the 40 microgram per 
liter standard, the 42 microgram per liter reading 
was indicative of high nutrient levels in the 
water. As a result, the mouth of Currituck Sound 
will be classified as "support threatened" for its 
class "C' water uses which include propagation 
of aquatic life and secondary recreation Qohn 
Dorney, personal communication). 
Ideas abound concerning the causes and symp-
toms of the perceived Currituck Sound water 
quality problems. The interviews focused atten-
tion on three issues affecting water quality in the 
Currituck Sound drainage basin: agricultural 
runoff, development, and salinity changes. 
In the Back Bay-North Landing River 
watershed, there are approximately 350 farm 
units with an average size of 100 acres (Mann, 
1984). For the Currituck Sound drainage basin as 
a whole, the exact number of farms is unknown. 
No one can deny that cropland management 
impacts water quality in the Currituck Sound 
drainage basin. One might question the extent of 
agricultural runoff's contribution to perceived 
water quality problems. Overall, farm acreage 
has declined while the water quality situation has 
worsened. This observation on reduced farm 
acreage is based on scrutiny of Agricultural 
Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) 
aerial photographs dating from the 1930's to the 
present (Ron Southwick, personal communication). 
Much of the farmland no longer in production 
has been developed and is now part of the Virginia 
Beach urban complex. The Currituck Sound 
watershed lies within the Norfolk-Virginia Beach 
Mean Metropolitan Statistical Area. A region 
experiencing rapid growth, the drainage basin 
has expanded in terms of urban area and popu-
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lation. Currituck County, a bedroom community 
for the mushrooming cities to the north, under-
went a greater than 20 percent increase in 
permanent population between 1980-86 
(Albemarle-Pamlico Estuarine Study, undated). 
Development, like agriculture, contributes to the 
perceived water quality issue. 
The population increase for Virginia Beach 
during the 1970's exceeded 50 percent (Mann, 
1984). Tidewater Virginia grew more slowly in 
the 1980's, but the overall population continued 
to climb. Most of the urbanization occurred in the 
northern sector of Virginia Beach and to the 
northwest of the city. This helped preserve the 
water quality of Back Bay and the rural quality 
of the southern portion of the coastal city. 
Furthermore, the City of Virginia Beach has 
expressed the desire to continue efforts to protect 
the rural character of the Back Bay watershed. 
Adopted by the City Council, the Comprehensive 
Plan established a "green line" south of which 
development is limited. However, as developable 
land becomes more scarce north of the "green 
line", there will be increasing pressure to expand 
southward. This is a matter of great concern to 
those involved in management of the Currituck 
Sound watershed and its resources. 
The final perceived problem affecting water 
quality in the Sound is changes in salinity. The 
saltwater versus freshwater controversy has 
existed for many years in North Carolina. The 
argument climaxed in the early l 980's when 
citizens proposed introduction of seawater into 
Currituck Sound to restore water quality. This 
idea was based on the principle that positively-
charged particles in saline water will bind with 
negatively-charged soil particles and precipitate 
out of solution. This, in turn, results in improved 
water clarity and, thereby, allows sunlight to 
penetrate the water column. One desired out-
come is increased plant production which is 
beneficial for fish and waterfowl (Norman, 1988). 
Salinities in excess of ten percent sea strength, 
however, interfere with largemouth bass 
(Micropterus salmoides) reproduction (Currituck 
Sound Task Committee, 1980). For this reason, 
sports fishermen opposed introduction of salt-
water into Currituck Sound, a nationally famous 
largemouth bass fishery. North Carolina never 
attempted to change this freshwater estuary's 
salt content due to the prohibitive cost and 
uncertainty about possible effects (Currituck 
Sound Task Committee, 1980). The City of 
Virginia Beach did pump seawater into Back Bay 
intermittently between 1965 and the mid-1980's. 
During this time, water quality in the Bay did not 
improve. In fact, water clarity and vegetation 
reached "record lows" during the pumping period 
(Norman and Southwick, 1987). The Virginia 
Fish and Game Department forced Virginia Beach 
to discontinue pumping seawater into Back Bay 
in 1985. Presently, there is general agreement 
that the Currituck Sound-Back Bay complex 
should be managed as a freshwater estuary. 
Resource managers and researchers also 
perceived declining water quality to be a signif-
icant management issue for the Currituck Sound 
drainage basin. Although the available data 
indicate that Currituck Sound possesses the 
highest level of water quality in the coastal area 
of northeastern North Carolina (Currituck 
Sound Task Committee, 1980; John Dorney, 
personal communication), there is still concern 
among resource professionals. Agricultural 
production and rapid urban development in the 
watershed are viewed as the primary causes of 
declining water quality in the Currituck Sound-
Back Bay complex. 
The Fishery and Waterfowl Habitat 
Along with water quality, there is a general 
perception that the fishery and waterfowl habitat 
is declining. Below normal rainfall during the 
1980's has resulted in reduced freshwater input 
into Currituck Sound. The salinity level has 
increased "beyond tolerable limits for most 
freshwater species" (Kornegay, 1989). Although 
fish populations are not statistically lower than 
in the 1970's (Kornegay, 1989), many fishermen 
feel they just are not catching the numbers of fish 
they did in past years (Mike Corcoran, personal 
communication). Sportsmen in the Back Bay area 
would agree (Norman, 1988). Norman, a biologist 
with the Virginia Department of Game and 
Inland Fisheries, summarized the sport fishing 
situation as follows: 
"This gold mine of a freshwater fishery began a 
rapid decline in the early 1980's and has 
continued its decline up to the present day. As 
a result, there is virtually no freshwater fishery 
in Back Bay today" (Norman, 1988). 
Norman and his coworker Ron Southwick believe 
that high salinity levels and loss of the formerly 
abundant submerged aquatic vegetation (SAV) 
contributed to the decline in the freshwater 
fishery and waterfowl habitat. 
Rapid development in the Currituck Sound 
drainage basin has also had a negative impact on 
wildlife, especially waterfowl. Prior to the 1980's, 
Currituck Sound was one of the premier water-
fowl wintering areas along the Atlantic flyway. 
During the last decade, however, there has been 
a significant decline in populations of ducks, 
geese, and swans utilizing Currituck Sound. 
Based on aerial, midwinter surveys, waterfowl 
populations in the Currituck Sound area have 
decreased at a "much greater rate than elsewhere 
in eastern North Carolina" (Dennis Luszcz, 
personal communication). Luszcz, Waterfowl 
Project Leader for the North Carolina Wildlife 
Resources Commission, attributes the decline to 
increased human disturbance, loss of submerged 
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aquatic vegetation, and nsmg salinity levels. 
"There have been noticeable changes in a short 
period of time" (Dennis Luszcz, personal 
communication). 
Issue 2: Lack of a Coordinated Management 
Approach 
The State of North Carolina and Commonwealth 
of Virginia share responsibility for any decline in 
the waters or resource values of the Currituck 
Sound-Back Bay complex. Ecosystems do not 
recognize state borders. This leads us to the 
second broad issue category uncovered during 
the interviews: lack of cooperation between/ 
among the governing bodies responsible for the 
management of the Currituck Sound drainage 
basin. 
Several agencies representing four different 
levels of government manage land and water in 
the study area (Table 1). No one agency, however, 
possesses all the functions required for effective 
natural resource management. In addition, there 
is no comprehensive environmental management 
plan for the Currituck Sound watershed. Pres-
ently, the many managing agencies operate 
independently. Federal, state, and local officials 
agree that North Carolina and Virginia must 
cooperate in order to best manage the Currituck 
Sound- Back Bay complex. 
Analysis of Prospective Management Alternatives 
This section of the report will focus on three 
classes of management options in order of 
increasing departure from existing conditions: 
1. Alternatives requiring no new institutions 
- Maintenance of the status quo 
- Increased local government action 
2. Alternatives requiring formation of new, non-
statutory institutions 
- Administrative agreement 
- Interstate planning agency 
3. Alternatives requiring formation of new, 
statutory institutions 
- Interstate compact 
- Federal-interstate compact. 
Alternatives Requiring No New Institutions 
Maintenance of the Status Quo 
Maintaining current management strategies in 
the Currituck Sound- Back Bay complex would 
allow time for scientists to gather and analyze 
data on the status of the resource. This new 
information, in turn, would more definitively 
answer the questions of whether and why 
Currituck Sound is in a state of decline . In this 
scenario, the basis for future action would be fact 
rather than perception. No difficult or binding 
decisions would have to be made at this time. 
Thus, maintaining the status quo is politically 
attractive. 
However, under the current management 
system, the responsible agencies have failed to 
manage and monitor Currituck Sound/Back Bay. 
This is evident from the shortage of published 
material dealing with the study area. In addition, 
local governments such as Currituck County 
have not received sufficient expert help in 
managing the Sound resources (Yates Barber, 
personal communication). In some cases, how-
ever, local governments in the watershed have 
acted without drawing on the available expertise. 
The result has been a perceived decline in the 
quality of the Currituck Sound/Back Bay ecosys-
tem and its many resources. 
Finally, the current management strategies do 
not address the perceived need for cooperative 
management of the bi-state resource, especially 
in the critical areas of growth management, 
water quality control, and water supply. Cur-
rently, North Carolina and Virginia work inde-
pendently on problems related to management of 
the Currituck Sound drainage basin. There is no 
concerted effort to manage the watershed as a 
system. 
Increased Local Government Action 
Local governments in the Currituck Sound 
watershed constantly face two seemingly 
opposed forces: development pressure and 
demands for environmental protection. In addi-
tion, local governments must provide public 
services and facilities to serve existing popula-
tions. Preserving the natural character of the 
Currituck Sound-Back Bay complex and promot-
ing development in the drainage basin is impos-
sible without active local government participa-
tion. Federal and state agencies have only limited 
authority in this arena while "local governments 
have the jurisdiction-through zoning and police 
powers-to thoroughly address the wide variety 
of water quality problems and their sources .. 
(Division of Coastal Management, 1986). Land 
use planning and growth management systems 
are methods whereby local governments such as 
Currituck County and the cities of Chesapeake 
and Virginia Beach can balance preservation and 
development. Among the many alternatives 
available to local governments for growth 
management are: transfer of development rights, 
preferential assessment, performance zoning, 
population caps, annual permit limits, conserva-
tion easements, and local environmental impact 
ordinances. 
Increased local government action in manage-
ment of the Currituck Sound drainage basin has 
inherent advantages. Involving local people who 
live in the watershed and depend upon the 
estuarine ecosystem for their livelihood is the 
primary advantage of this option. Traditionally, 
North Carolina has given local governments 
authority in the land use regulation arena due 
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to the belief that "citizens should have maximum 
direct control over the specific areas within which 
they live and work" (Green and Heath, 1984). 
Local governments are already involved in 
management of the Currituck Sound watershed. 
They possess planning, permitting, and enforce-
ment powers granted to them by the respective 
states. Under this alternative, no time would be 
wasted in negotiating an agreement between the 
multiple agencies involved in management of the 
resource. Local governments could act imme-
diately to enact growth management measures. 
However, no single local government has 
complete geographic jurisdiction over the Curri-
tuck Sound drainage basin and, for that reason, 
cannot single-handedly resolve the watershed's 
problems. In addition, the local governments lack 
resources such as money and manpower which 
are essential for education, research, and policy 
enforcement. Finally, the local governments have 
a vested economic interest in promoting develop-
ment: "They [local governments] have a legisla-
tive charge and public mandate to pursue eco-
nomic development to some degree" (John 
Carlock, personal communication). Environmen-
tal problems resulting from rapid or unplanned 
growth may be ignored until the situation 
reaches crisis proportions. 
Alternatives Requiring New, Non-Statutory 
Institutions 
inistrative A reement 
ording to Zimmerman and Wendell (1951), 
the administrative agreement is" ... an informal 
or a formal arrangement between administrative 
departments or officers of two or more states ... " 
which does not require the approval of Congress. 
This third alternative offers opportunity for 
action at the state level outside the confines of a 
legally-binding interstate compact. The primary 
powers and functions of an agency formed by 
administrative agreement include development 
of institutional arrangements for cooperation on 
water resource matters of mutual interest and 
formation of joint positions on major issues in the 
broad arenas of water resources management 
and water quality control (North Carolina-
Virginia Water Resources Management Commit-
tee et al., 1982). 
An agency formed by administrative agree-
ment has certain advantages over the preceding 
alternatives and alternative interstate institu-
tions. First, this less formal mechansim can avoid 
the delays and political repercussions involved 
with legislative ratification. In addition, commit-
tees formed by administrative agreement gener-
ally operate within pre-existing agencies, ther-
eby, they place a low financial burden on the 
participating states. Finally, there is a precedent 
for cooperation between the State of North 
Carolina and the Commonwealth of Virginia via 
this mechanism. In 197 4, Governors Godwin and 
Holshouser created the now defunct North 
Carolina-Virginia Water Resources Management 
Committee by written agreement. The Commit-
tee concentrated on water resource problems in 
the North Carolina-Virginia Tidewater area, of 
which the Currituck Sound drainage basin is a 
significant portion. 
The voluntary administrative agreement 
mechanism suffers several disadvantages includ-
ing organizational and structural problems. 
Typically, agencies formed by administrative 
agreement lack planning, regulatory, and 
enforcement powers. Other inherent problems in 
this type of agency include inability to influence 
water resources decisions made by local and 
regional governing bodies; lack of accountability; 
inadequate financial resources; and poor conti-
nuity in time (North Carolina-Virginia Water 
Resources Management Committee et al., 1982). 
A final disadvantage of the administrative 
agreement is its somewhat uncertain legal status. 
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the 
United States prohibits agreements and compacts 
among states without the consent of Congress. 
A literal interpretation of this directive would 
construe the term "agreement" as to include 
every agreement, written or verbal, formal or 
informal. In 1893, however, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the constitutional prohibition as to 
compacts or agreements among the states with-
out the consent of Congress was "directed to the 
formation of any combination tending to increase 
the political power in the States, which may 
encroach upon or interfere with the just supre-
macy of the United States" (148 U.S. 503, 519 
(1893)). Clearly, an administrative agreement 
between North Carolina and Virginia designed to 
deal with water resources issues in the Currituck 
Sound drainage basin would not interfere with 
the power relationship between the two states 
and the nation. 
Interstate Planning Agency 
The interstate planning agency functions to 
develop and encourage planning processes 
between the states (Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1972). Normally, 
interstate planning commissions have the power 
to: 
"collect, analyze, and distribute data; conduct 
studies and prepare reports on existing or 
potential problems; serve as an advisory board; 
and identify and recommend actions to local, 
state, or Federal jurisdictions for more 
coordinated management" (North Carolina-
Virginia Water Resources Management 
Committee et al., 1982). 
In the case of the Currituck Sound drainage 
basin, an interstate planning agency would 
prepare plans to direct management of the Sound 
277 
complex and its many resources. These plans, 
however, should be consistent with the two basin 
states' existing coastal area management pro-
grams. The North Carolina Coastal Area Man-
agement Act directs all State agencies to keep 
informed of federal and interstate agency plans, 
activities, and procedures within their areas of 
expertise that affect the coastal area: 
HWhere federal or interstate agency plans, 
activities, or procedures conflict with State 
policies, all reasonable steps shall be taken by the 
State to preserve the integrity of its policiesH 
(G .S. 113A-127). 
North Carolina and Virginia would be free to 
voluntarily implement the recommendations of 
such an interstate planning agency. 
An interstate planning commission can be in 
operation much more quickly than a more formal 
coordinative mechanism such as an interstate 
compact commission (Chesapeake Bay Legisla-
tive Advisory Commission, 1979). Thus, an 
interstate planning agency could easily be 
designed as a precursor to a formal cooperative 
management program. Serving as a foundation 
for cooperation, the agency's first priority would 
be exchange of information and identification of 
basinwide problems. The interstate planning 
agency "can serve as a visible regional focus for 
water problems and can help develop a regional 
perspective toward water resources manage-
ment" (North Carolina- Virginia Water Resour-
ces Management Committee et al., 1982). 
As with any option, the interstate planning 
agency mechanism does have drawbacks. First, 
this form of agency lacks the regulatory and 
enforcement powers needed to implement its 
plans. Member states participate on a voluntary 
basis and are not obliged by law to put the 
interstate agency's plans into effect, reducing the 
interstate planning agency to an advocacy role 
(Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations, 1972). In addition, this type of agency 
usually must rely on federal, state, and local 
agencies for information, aid in preparing plans, 
and execution of plans. Jurisdictional fragmenta-
tion in the drainage basin would slow the work 
of an interstate planning agency just as it 
currently prevents effective management of the 
Currituck Sound-Back Bay system. These disad-
vantages have hindered many interstate planning 
commissions to the point that they had only 
"marginal impact on improving basinwide water 
resources management" (North Carolina-
Virginia Water Resources Management Commit-
tee et al., 1982). 
Alternatives Requiring New, Statutory 
Institutions 
Interstate Compact Commission 
Since the inception of America, states have 
entered legally- binding compacts in order to 
address bi- or multi-state issues in a cooperative 
fashion. These compacts are contractual in nature 
and take precedence over other state statutes (21 
U.S. 1, 91-92 (1823)). If necessary, an interstate 
compact can be enforced by suit in the Supreme 
Court. 
Creation of a compact between the State of 
North Carolina and Commonwealth of Virginia 
would require that the states' respective legisla-
tures pass identical laws authorizing the compact. 
Then, Congress would have to give consent 
through resolution or ratifying legislation. 
Congressional approval, however, is not a large 
obstacle as Congress generally grants consent to 
compacts drawn and agreed to by the party states 
(Leach and Sugg, 1959). Moreover, the Federal 
Coastal Zone Management Act (90 Stat 1019) 
granted consent of Congress to any two or more 
coastal states to negotiate and enter into agree-
ments or compacts which do not conflict with any 
law or treaty of the United States, for 
1. "developing and administering coordinated 
coastal zone planning, policies, and 
programs ... and 
2. establishing executive instrumentalities or 
agencies which such States deem desirable for 
the implementation of such agreements or 
compacts" (16 U.S.C. 1456b(b)). 
Similar in content, wording, and form to an 
international treaty (Zimmerman and Wendell, 
1951), interstate compacts are, essentially, 
treaties between two or more states. "It is 
generally accepted that the compact device 
affords the most appropriate legal base for 
administration of a single facility that stretches 
across state lines" (Barton, 1967). This reasoning 
may also be applied to natural systems such as the 
Currituck Sound-Back Bay complex which strad-
dles the North Carolina-Virginia border. The 
interstate compact insures intergovernmental 
cooperation on activities affecting interjurisdic-
tional resources. This form of agreement has 
been successfully utilized to abate and control 
pollution in shared watersheds as well as to 
facilitate development of water and related land 
resources. 
Interstate compacts have some advantages 
over other coordinative mechanisms in address-
ing interstate probiems. First, the compact is a 
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formal, legally-binding agreement indicative of 
the participating states' commitment to resolving 
the issue at hand. After the agreement is final-
ized, execution of compact terms is mandatory 
rather than voluntary. This mechanism is more 
powerful and stable than the administrative 
agreement or interstate planning agency. Gener-
ally, compact representatives meet on a regular 
basis, thereby maintaining a continuous interac-
tive relationship among the member states. An 
interstate compact commission, with aid from 
existing management institutions, could manage 
the Currituck Sound-Back Bay complex from an 
ecosystem perspective. 
Although this alternative has great potential, 
it has been utilized, primarily, when all else failed. 
States are reluctant to enter an interstate 
compact until they are convinced that independ-
ent federal, state, and local efforts cannot resolve 
the problem. Public and political acceptablitity of 
the compact mechanism is generally low because 
this formal coordinative device if often viewed as 
an infringement on traditional state and local 
jurisdictions. Acceptability of the compact mech-
anism as a coordinative tool for management of 
the Currituck Sound drainage basin may be 
further hampered by North Carolina's recent 
controversial involvement in the Low Level 
Radioactive Waste Compact and the Southeast-
ern Compact. As a result of the compact affilia-
tions, North Carolina has been selected as the site 
for a low level radioactive waste repository and 
a hazardous waste incinerator. Exhibiting the 
Not In My Backyard (NIMBY) Syndrome, many 
North Carolinians have revolted against the 
respective compacts' waste disposal decisions. 
The State of North Carolina, however, is legally 
obligated to fulfill compact duties. 
The amount of time required to negotiate and 
ratify an interstate compact is also a major 
negative aspect of this alternative. The average 
time needed for compact formation is greater 
than 8 years (Muys, 1971). During the negotia-
tion and ratification periods, the party states 
usually engage in few or limited cooperative 
efforts. As a result, immediate problems receive 
little attention and may worsen. There is no 
reliable way to estimate how long it would take 
North Carolina and Virginia to agree on terms for 
a compact. Perhaps, the two states would never 
reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. 
Other predominant drawbacks of the inter-
state compact mechanism stem from member 
states' jealousy and distrust of compact commis-
sions (Leach and Sugg, 1959). Often, state and 
local government officials fear that a compact 
commission will become a "regional supergovern-
men t" that will ride roughshod over their 
interests (North Carolina-Virginia Water 
Resources Management Committee et al., 1982). 
This distrust and fear prompts states to limit the 
powers of compact commissions to the point that 
they become ineffective in resolving issues 
(North Carolina-Virginia Water Resources Man-
agement Committee et al., 1982). Another result 
of distrust on part of the member states is that 
the compact commission is purposefully alienated 
from the respective states' administrations and 
legislatures: the commission stands alone as a 
regional agency (Leach and Sugg, 1959). Lack of 
integration into the administrative fabric, in turn, 
leads to inadequate liaison and coordination 
(Chesapeake Bay Legislative Advisory Commis-
sion, 1979). 
An interstate compact commission could 
effectively manage the Currituck Sound drainage 
basin if granted sufficient acceptance and power. 
The State of North Carolina and Commonwealth 
of Virginia should not consider this alternative, 
however, unless they are convinced that the 
identified problems need a regional solution. In 
order to succeed, this option would require 
enormous commitment, cooperation, and effort. 
Federal-Interstate Compact Commission 
A compact in which the federal government is a 
full and formal participant, the federal-interstate 
compact acts as a "mechanism to unite the 
constitutional powers of state and federal 
government while creating a regulatory agency 
of all party jurisdictions" (Council of State 
Governments, 1979). Enactment of a federal-
interstate compact requires ratification by the 
signatory states' legislatures and, also, Congres-
sional approval. Congress must give consent to 
the compact itself and to federal participation on 
the resulting compact agency. Typically, federal-
interstate compact commissions are composed of 
the governors of the respective member states 
and one representative appointed by the Presi-
dent of the United States (North Carolina-
Virginia Water Resources Management Commit-
tee et al., 1982). 
The federal-interstate compact mechanism is 
very similar to the interstate compact commis-
sion discussed in the previous section. The federal 
government serves as a full member of a federal-
interstate compact commission. In contrast, 
ordinary interstate compact commissions exclude 
the federal government from membership. 
Federal-interstate compact agencies have one 
distinct advantage over other mechanisms for 
interstate cooperation: they require cooperation 
between the states and the federal government. 
In the Currituck Sound drainage basin, the 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service alone is 
responsible for management of more than 
125,000 acres of land. In addition, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Army Corps of 
Engineers, and Soil Conservation Service play a 
significant role in land and water resources 
management. The federal-interstate compact 
mechanism provides the opportunity for the 
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highest attainable level of cooperation between 
the multiple agencies responsible for manage-
ment of the study area. Additionally, a federal-
interstate compact would have sufficient power 
and authority to address the water supply and 
land space issues in the Currituck Sound drainage 
basin. 
There are, of course, distinct disadvantages to 
this cooperative mechanism. First, a federal-
interstate compact commission would suffer all 
the drawbacks common to the interstate compact 
commission. Furthermore, formation of a 
federal-interstate compact commission to deal 
with the perceived issues in the Currituck Sound 
drainage basin would present a significant 
departure from the water laws and institutions 
of North Carolina and Virginia. It would be very 
difficult to build the broad public and political 
support necessary to create such an agency 
(North Carolina-Virginia Water Resources Man-
agement Committee et al., 1982). 
Comparison of the Alternative Management 
Strategies 
Each prospective coordi111ative mechanism pos-
sesses distinct advantages and disadvantages. 
Ultimately, selection and implementation of a 
management alternative will depend upon the 
priorities of the many managing agencies in the 
study area and of the citizens in the two states. 
Comparing the prospective management alterna-
tives in terms of critical attributes and capabilities 
will provide the information necessary for final 
decision making (Tables 2 and 3). 
No single alternative possesses all the desirable 
characteristics and capabilities of the ideal natural 
resource management agency. For example, 
maintenance of the status quo ranks high for 
public and political acceptability; however, this 
alternative does not vest complete geographic 
jurisdiction in a single managing agency. In 
contrast, a federal-interstate compact commis-
sion would have jurisdiction over the entire study 
area, but would probably fail to gain widespread 
political and public support. The compact mech-
anism would represent a significant departure 
from current management strategies. 
The prospective management alternatives fall 
along continuums for flexibility and power. 
Flexibility allows a natural resource management 
agency to take more innovative approaches to 
solving problems. A flexible agency is not 
restrained by controls and standard operating 
procedures. Ranking the management alterna-
tives in order from most to least flexible produces 
the following list: 
1. Maintenance of the status quo 
2. Increased local government action 
3. Adoption of an administrative agreement 
4: Creation of an interstate planning agency 
5. Formation of an interstate compact 
commission 
6. Formation of a federal-interstate compact 
commission. 
Compact commissions are inflexible because their 
duties are explicitly stated in their ratifying 
legislation. The formality and contractual nature 
of compacts limit flexibility (Leach and Sugg, 
1959). Ironically, the exact attributes of the 
compact mechanism which curb flexibility serve 
to empower compact agencies. Typically, compact 
commissions have planning, regulatory, and 
enforcement powers (North Carolina-Virginia 
Water Resources Management Committee et al., 
1982) as well as complete geographic jurisdiction. 
Flexibility and power are inversely related. Thus, 
arranging the prospective management alterna-
tives from most to least powerful results in a list 
that is the inverse of the one above: 
1. Formation of a federal-interstate compact 
commission 
2. Formation of an interstate compact 
commission 
3. Creation of an interstate planning agency 
4. Adoption of an administrative agreement 
5. Increased local government action 
6. Maintenance of the status quo. 
Conclusions 
There are two broad categories of perceived 
issues surrounding management of the Curri-
tuck Sound drainage basin. First, Currituck 
Sound is perceived to be a declining resource with 
respect to water quality, the fishery, and water-
fowl wintering grounds. Insufficient data exist to 
confirm the opinion that Currituck Sound is a 
declining resource, however. No comprehensive 
study has been conducted for the Currituck 
Sound-Back Bay complex since the early 1960's 
when the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, 
North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission, 
and Virginia Commission of Game and Inland 
Fisheries carried out a cooperative study popu-
larly referred to as the "Sincock Study". 
Second, no single resource management 
agency has complete geographic jurisdiction over 
the watershed. Since the time of the "Sincock 
Study", the Currituck Sound watershed has 
experienced rapid population growth and devel-
opment. Much change has occurred in the study 
area. Throughout this period of growth and 
change, North Carolina and Virginia have failed 
to cooperate in the management of their shared 
ecosystem. Responsibility for management of the 
Currituck Sound-Back Bay system was, and still 
is, split among multiple federal, state, and local 
jurisdictions. 
Many resource managers perceive a crisis 
situation for Currituck Sound. Government 
officials, resource managers, and the public must 
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reach a consensus on the best course of action. 
Selection of a responsive management strategy 
stands as the first step toward resolving the 
issues of the Currituck Sound drainage basin as 
well as the entire Albemarle-Pamlico Estuarine 
study area. 
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Army Corps of Engineers (COE) 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS) 
?la Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge 
?la Currituck National Wildlife Refuge 
?la Dismal Swamp National Wildlife Refuge 
?la Mackey Island National Wildlife Refuge 
Soil Conservation Service (SCS) 
Division of Coastal Management (DCM) 
?la Currituck Banks Estuarine Research Reserve 
Division of Environmental Management (DEM) 
Division of Land Resources (DLR) 
Division of Marine Fisheries (DMF) 
Division of Water Resources (DWR) 
Wildlife Resources Commission (WRC) 
?la Northwest River Game Lands 
Council on the Environment (VCOE) 
Chesapeake Local Assistance Department (CLAD) 
Department of Game and Inland Fisheries (DGIF) 
?la Pocahontai. Waterfowl Management Area 
?la Trojan Waterfowl Management Area 
Division of Soil and Water Conservation (DSWC) 
Division of State Parks (DSP) 
?la False Cape State Park 
Marine Resources Commission (MRC) 






Albemarle Regional Development Commission (ARDC) 
Hampton Roads Planning District Commission (HRPDC) 
(HRPDC was formerly referred to as the Southeastern 
Virginia Planning District Commission) 
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Table 2. Comparison of the Prospective Management Alternatives. 
Attributes of a Successful 
Natural Resource Management Agency 
Complete geographic jurisdiction 
Continuity in time 
Flexibility 
Political/Public acceptability 
Power to enforce plans at ecosystem level 
Wide special interest appeal 
(Represent varied interests) 
• No new institutions 
l=Maintenance of status quo 
2=Increased local government action 
New, Non-statutory Institutions 
3=Agency formed by administrative agreement 
4=Interstate planning agency 
New, Statutory Institutions 
S=lnterstate compact commission 










2 3 4 5 6 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
No No No Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 3. Comparison of the Prospective Management Alternatives (b) . 
Planning 
Duties of a Natural Resource 
Management Agency 
(after Matthews, 1976) 
Public education 
Regulatory/enforcement functions 
Receiving and administering funds 
Research 
Fostering intergovernmental relations 
• No new institutions 
! =Maintenance of status quo 
2=lncreased local government action 
New, Non-statutory Institutions 
3=Agency formed by administrative agreement 
4=lnterstate planning agency 
New, Statutory Institutions 
S=lnterstate compact commission 










3 4 5 6 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No No Yes Yes 
No Yes Yes Yes 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Figure 1. CURRITUCK SOUND DRAINAGE BASIN 
--Back Bay NWR 
__ - _ Currituck Sound 
Watershed Boundary 
ALBEMARLE SOUND 




Figure I. Currituck Sound Drainage Basin 
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